






Abstract: This article argues that there is a strong relationship between
the efficiency with which a country mobilized capital for industrial devel
opment and the industrial structurethat country developed. Differences in
capital market development were a function of government regulatory
policies and the costs ofobtaining information. The analysis suggests that
the development offinancial institutions was not endogenous tothe process
of economic growth. In the case of Mexico, tight government regulatory
policies coupled with high information costs gaye rise to highly imperfect
capital markets, which in turn were transmuted into imperfections in
product markets.
Resumen: Este artículo demuestra que hay una fuerte relación entre la
eficiencia de la movilización de capitales y la estructura industrial de un
país. Las diferencias en el desarrollo de mercados de capitales eran resul
tado de las políticas regulatorias y los costos de información. El análisis
sugiere que el desarrollo de instituciones financieras no fue endógeno en el
proceso de desarrollo económico. En lo que respecta a México, las regulacio
nes gubernamentales restrictivas, aunadas a los costos de información
superiores, dieron como resultado mercados de capitales sumamente im
perfectos, que a su vez transmitieron imperfecciones en los mercados de
productos.
M
ichael Postan, the economic historian of the middle ages, once
remarked that the entire English industrial revolution of the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries could have been financed
single-handedly by any one of Europe’s medieval millionaires. The
Social Science History Institute, Stanford University. Financial support for this research
was generously provided by the Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (irus) Center at
the University ofMaryland, the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the Universitv ofCalifornia,
San Diego, and the Social Science Research Council.
Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época, vol. VII, núm. 1, primer semestre de 1998 5Stephen Haber Financial Market Regulation
problem of finance during the early stages of industrialization, as
Postan correctly pointed out, was not one ofthe accumulation ofcapital
so much as the mobilization ofcapital —movingcapital from the people
who had (and often hoarded) it to those who needed to borrow it for
industrial investment.
The problem posed by Postan — the effect ofcapital immobilities
on industrial development — has received considerable attention from
economic historians.’ Surprisingly, almost all ofthe empirical research
to date has focused on countries that had, by world standards, fairly
well developed capital markets. Little work has been done on the
relationship between capital market integration and the degree of
industry concentration in economies with truly imperfect capital mar
kets, such as Mexico. Moreover, because of the absence of data, the
studies on developed economies have not developed cross-national
estimates of industrial concentration that would allow researchers to
measure systematically the impact of access to institutional sources of
capital on the structure ofindustry. Researchers have largely relied on
qualitative information or on data from the very recent past (almost all
ofit of post-1950 vintage) to make cross-national comparisons. 2 These
features of the available data (its recent vintage and its focus on
economies with well developed capital markets) have made the testing
of hypotheses about the long term relationship between the matura
tion of capital markets and the growth and structure of industry
problematic, ifnot impossible. Indeed, given the nature ofthe data, it
is little wonder that the extant literature suggests that levels of
industrial concentration do not vary significantly across economies.
Smaller economies simply have smaller firms.
This paper proposes to move beyond the literature on the econo
mies of Western Europe and the United States through an historical
analysis ofthe impact of access to impersonal sources ofcapital on the
development ofthe cotton textile manufacture during the early stages
of industrialization (1830-1930) in two less developed economies with
different histories offinancial market regulation: Mexico and Brazil. It
contrasts their experience with that of the United States during a
similar period in its industrial development.
1 lnterest among economic historians began with the seminal articles by Lance Davis and
Alexander Gerschenkron in the 1960s. See Davis, “Capital Markets”; Davis, “Capital Immobi
lities”; and Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, chap. 1.
2 See, for example, Davis, “Capital Markets,” p. 271; Pryor, “An International Compari
son,” p. 136; Adelman, “Monopoly and Concentration,” p. 19; Bain, International Differences;
Atack, “Firm Size and Industrial Structure,” p. 465.
1 focus on the cotton textile industry for two reasons. First, the
cotton goods manufacture was the most important industry in the un
derdeveloped economies under study. It surpassed ah other industries
in terms of capital invested, size of the work force, or percentage of
value-added it contributed to total industrial output. 3 Second, there are
compelling theoretical reasons to focus on cotton textiles. In under
developed economies numerous factors, such as large economies ofscale
or technological barriers to entry, can condition the development of
manyindustries. Separatingthe effects ofaccess to impersonal sources
of capital from among these other factors is difficult across the entire
industrial sector. In the cotton textile industry, however, these other
factors did not come into play: the capital equipment was easily
divisible, the minimum efficient scale of production was small, and
non-financial barriers to entry were largely absent. The onlyimportant
barrier to entry was access to finance. The textile industry therefore
provides an excellent test case of the relationship between the devel
opment of the financial markets that provide capital to an industry,
and the development ofthe industry itself. 5
The cases selected for study were chosen in order to test the
hypotheses that the regulatory environment has a profound effect on
the structure and size of financial markets, and that the structure
and size of financial markets has a significant effect on the size and
structure ofindustry. 1 therefore searched for cases which had notably
different histories offinancial market regulation.
The United States was chosen because it is the touchstone case: it
was an international leader in financial market development and
industrial growth during the period under study. 6 Brazil and Mexico
were chosen because they were the most industrialized countries in
As Kuznets pointed out, textiles tend to be the first manufacturing industry to develop
as economies modernize. The countries under study here therefore conform to this general
pattern. See Kuznets, Economic Growth ofNations, pp. 111-113.
For a discussion of these other factors in Mexico see Haber, Industry and Underdevel
opment, especially chapters 4, 5, 6.
This does not mean that scale economies were insignificant in cotton textile production.
Indeed, had economies ofscale been negligible, access to capital could not have served as a barrier
to entry. It does mean, however, that scale economies were exhausted in textiles at relatively
small firm sizes compared to such industries as steel, cement, and chemicais.
6 This is not to suggest that problems of capital mobilization did not exist in the United
States. The market for industrial securities was regional in nature until the late nineteenth
century. Similarly, banks tended not to make loans outside their region. It is to suggest, however,
that capital mobilization problems were significantly less severe in the United States than in
the underdeveloped world and that the regulation of financial markets was far less repressive
in the U.S. case than in the underdeveloped world.
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Latin America. More importantiy, these two cases provide a counter
factual test of the hypotheses central to this study. Throughout the
nineteenth century, Mexico and Brazil both followed highiy repressive
regulatory policies. In 1889, however, Brazil drasticaily changed its
financial market regulations to a liberal, relativeiy non-repressive
environment, while Mexico held on to its oid repressive policies. More
over, the costs ofobtaining information were iowered in Brazil because
its financial market regulations required ah publiciy heid joint stock
companies to publish balance sheets and iists ofshareholders two times
each year. Brazil thus provides a relevant test for understanding the
opportunity iost by Mexico when it faiied to enact iess repressive
poiicies and faiied to iower the costs ofobtaining information.
The argument advanced runs in the foiiowing terms. The size and
structure of capital markets piayed a crucial role in determining the
size and structure ofthe textiie industry. In Mexico, where the banking
system was smail and concentrated, the distribution of bank loans
among potentiai textile industrialists was narrow. Differential access
to ioans from banks or from the informal network oflarge, Mexico City
merchants, in turn, gaye rise to differential access to equity capital:
entrepreneurs with the proven ability to obtain loans for working
capital had a significant advantage overtheir competitorswhen it came
to sehhing equity in the securities markets. In short, a small group of
powerful financiers was able to obtain all the capital theyneeded, while
everyone else was starved for funds.
The results were two-fold. First, the textile industry was highly
concentrated, because access to impersonal sources ofcapital served as
a barrier to entry. Second, since the abihity to mobilize capital from
banks and the securities markets was a scarce talent, financial capi
talists played an important role in the development ofthe cotton textile
industry.
In countries where the institutional rules of the game created
larger and less concentrated capitalmarkets, such as the United States
or post-1889 Brazil, the distribution of funds among potential textile
industrialists was broader. Access to institutional sources of finance
did not, therefore, serve as a barrier to entry, which in turn meant that
the textile industry in those countries tended to be relatively less
concentrated. Moreover, in these cases, industry tended to become
increasingly less concentrated over time. This was precisely the oppo
site outcome that obtained in countries where access to institutional
sources ofcapital served as a barrier to entry. In the Mexican case, for
example, differential access to capital created by the limited opening
of the capital markets &uring the 1880s and 1890s actually gaye rise
to an increase in concentration.
The persistence of capital market imperfections in countries like
Mexico or pre-1889 Brazil can basically be tied to two factors. The first
was the high costs of information and monitoring. In Mexico, the lax
enforcement ofreportingrequirements made it extraordinarily difficult
to obtain information about the financial state of firms. Investors
therefore made investment decisions based on the personal reputations
of promoters. This meant that individuals with established repu
tations had a significant advantage over other potential industrialists
in raising capital.
The second factor in limiting the maturation ofcapital markets in
Mexico were repressive governmentregulatorypolicies. These included
restrictions on the chartering ofjoint stock enterprises, complicated
provisions for obtaining a bank charter, high minimum capital require
ments for banks, and restrictions on bank operations. These repressive
policies were enacted to favor small groups ofpohitically weli connected
financial capitalists by giving their banks special rights and privileges.
In return, their banks dedicated a significant part oftheir portfolios to
government loans, providing a stable and secure source ofstate finance.
The Mexican government was able to erect these kinds of barriers to
entry into banking because Mexico had very different legal traditions
than the United States. In fact, the legal tradition in Mexico was
characterized by the official promotion of monopoiy, legal decision by
fiat, and the centralization ofpolitical power. 7
The argument developed in this paper runs counter to the domi
nant view of how financiah systems develop. According to that view,
financial markets grow up more or less automaticaliy in response to
the growth in demand for financial services. 8 The argument advanced
here holds that the historical development offinancial intermediaries
is not flexible or automatic. In underdeveloped economies the demand
for finance may exceed the growth ofinstitutions designed to mobihize
capital forconsiderable periods oftime. Obviously, some capital market
These characteristics were exactly the opposite of those that prevailed in the United
States, where the legal tradition ofstate’s rights and a distrust ofmonopoly gaye rise to a much
more open banking structure. For a discussion of the U.S. case see: Smith and Sylla, “The
Transformation.”
8 For a more complete discussion see Patrick, “Financjal Development,” p. 175.
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development is endogenous, but government policies and the legal
tradition have strong independent effects.
The first section of this paper compares the institutional history
of financial intermediaries and textile mili financing in the three
countries over the period 1830 to 1930. The second section then
assesses changes in the size and structure of each country’s textile
industry in light of their histories of industrial finance. The third
section concludes.
1. Capital Markets and Textile Finance
The United States
Unlike the vast majority ofAmerican manufacturing companies ofthe
nineteenth century, which were organized as sole proprietorships or
partnerships, the large, verticaily integrated cotton textile producers
of New England were organizel as publicly-held, joint stock corpora
tions from their very beginnings in the 1820s. The market for these
securities was rudimentary during most of the century; the shares of
most companies were very closely heid, and their often high par values
(frequently $1 000) meant they couid not be bought by the typical small
investor. In addition, these companies appear to have been able to raise
capital on a regional scale only; out-of-state sharehoiders were so scarce
as to be virtually nonexistent. Yet these stocks were deemed ofinvest
ment quaiity, and their holders knew that a market, however circum
scribed, did exist for their sale. As early as 1835, 14 textile issues were
traded on the Boston Stock Exchange. This grew to 32 by 1850 and to
40 in 1865. This was notyet a well-developed securities market, but it did
provide for a wider distribution ofownership than more traditional forms
ofbusiness organizationwould have. Indeed, one ofthe striking aspects of
the large, Massachusetts-type companies was the pattern of wideiy
dispersed ownership ofshares among individuals and institutions.’°
As important as the sale ofequity in the capitalization ofthe early
textile milis was the ability of manufacturers, especially smaii and
mid-sized ones, to obtain Ioans from banks and other institutions. This
kind of institutional 1eiding to manufacturers appears to have been
confined to the northeast, which quickly developed a large banking
system. As early as 1819 New England had 84 banks with a capital of
$16.5 million. By 1860the region boasted 505 bankswith $123.6 million
in capital.h1
The large number of bank loans to textile manufacturers is not
surprising when you consider that the owners ofmilis tended to be the
same people that owned the banks. New England’s banks, as Naomi
Lamoreauxhas shown, were not the independent credit intermediaries
of economic theory.’ 2 Rather, they were the financial arms of kinship
groups whose investments spread across a wide number of economic
sectors and a wide number of enterprises. Basically, kinship groups
tapped the local supply of investable funds by founding a bank and
selling its equity to both individual and institutional investors. The
founding kinship groups then lent those funds to the various enter
prises under their control, including their own textiie milis. Insider
lending was the rule rather than the exception. Bank resources were
therefore monopolized by the families that founded them, leaving little
inthe way ofcredit for applicants outside ofthe kinship group.
Had legal restrictions been placed on the founding ofbanks, these
insider arrangements would have concentrated capital in the hands of
a small number of kinship groups, which, in turn would have led to
concentration in textile manufacturing. The fact that entry into bank
ing was essentially free, however, meant that it was difficult to restrict
entry into the textile industry by controlling access to capital. The U.S.
system did not provide for a completely equal distribution ofinvestable
funds, but it did allow a large number ofplayers to enter the game.
This regionally based capital market was gradually transformed
into a national capital market in the second halfofthe century, thanks
to the passage ofthe National Banking Act, which created a network
ofnationally chartered banks, and the widespread sale ofgovernment
bonds to the public. The practical effects ofthese institutional develop
ments were far-reaching. In the first place, the number of banks
mushroomed throughout the second half of the century. Second, be-
cause ofa peculiarity ofthe Civil War banking iaws prohibitingnation
9 For reasons ofspace, this discussion is brief. A book length work in progress bythe author
treats the cases in considerably more detail.
° Davis, “Stock Ownership,” pp. 207-214; Martin, A Century ofFinance, pp. 126-13 1; and
Navin and Sears, “Rise of a Market,” p. 110.
“ Davis, “New England Textile Milis,” pp. 2, 5; Davis, “Sources of Industrial Finance,”
p. 192; and Lamoreaux, “Banks, Kinship, and Economic Development,” p. 651.
12 Lamoreaux, op. cit.
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ally chartered banks from making loans on the basis of real estate
collateral, national banks in rural areas ofthe country deposited their
funds in the reserve city and central reserve city banks in urban areas.
This not only directly increased the supply offunds for industrial loans,
but also increased the supply of funds available for stock market
speculation. Finally, the public’s experience with canal company, rail
road, and government securities slowly convinced small investors that
paper securities were “as secure an investment as a house, a farm, or
a factory.” By the end ofWorld War 1 the textile industry was awash
in finance and many companies took advantage of the swollen credit
markets to float numerous securities issues.’ 4
In short, itwas not the case that ah Americantextile industrialists
had equal access to impersonal sources of capital. Indeed, one of the
primary reasons that the textile industry concentrated for so long in
New England was because of inter-regional capital immobilities. But
relative to the underdeveloped countries discussed below, large num
bers of U.S. industrialists were able to tap into the capital markets
quite early in the country’s industrial history.
Mexico
Mexico’s experience stands in stark contrast to that of the United
States. While Mexico began the transition to a mechanized textile in
dustry as early as the 1830s, it was not untilthe 1890sthatthe industry
underwent sustained growth. By this point, however, technological
changes had raised the cost ofentry into textile manufacturing. Thus,
unlike U.S. textile manufacturers, who were able to finance a signifi
cant part of their expansion and modernization through an extended
process ofthe reinvestment of profits, most Mexican textile firms had
to purchase their equipment ah at once, increasing the importance of
impersonal sources ofcapital.’ 5
The institutions that could mobilize impersonal sources ofcapital,
however, were very poorly developed in Mexico. Even after an expan
sion ofthe banking sector and the stock market in the 1880s and 1890s,
thevast majorityofmanufacturerswereunable to utilizethese avenues
tc mobilize capital.
Institutional lending to industry was largely absent in Mexico
until the 1880s. As late as 1884 there were only eight banks in
operation, and as late as 1911 Mexicohadbut 47 banks, only 10 ofwhich
were legally able to lend for terms ofmore than a year.’ 6 The few banks
able to make long-term loans existed primarily to finance urban and
rural real estate transactions; in fact, theyhad a great deal ofdifficulty
generating their own capital.’
Not onlywere there few banks, but the level ofconcentrationwithin
this small sector was very high. In 1895, three banks — the Banco
Internacional Hipotecario, the Banco de Londres y México, and the
Banco Nacional de México — accounted for two-thirds of the capital
invested in the banking system. The first two banks issued 80% of the
bank notes in circulation. Even as late as 1910 the same two banks
dominated the credit market, accounting for 75% of the deposits in
Mexico’s fine largest banks and roughly one-halfofah bank notes in cir-
culation.’ 8 If anything, the years after 1910 saw an increase in concen
tration, as the Mexican Revolution in that year threw capital markets
into disarray, destroyed the public’s faith in paper money, and put a
brake on the development ofthe banking sector until the late 192Os.’ 9
The result of Mexico’s slow and unequal development of credit
intermediaries was that most manufacturers could not obtain bank
financing. Even those that could only succeeded in getting short-term
loans to cover working capital costs. Thus, Mexico’s largest bank, the
Banco Nacional de México provided credit to a number oflarge indus
trial establishments in which its directors had interests. These in
cluded five of the nation’s largest cotton textile producers, its largest
wool textile mili, and the two firms that heid monopolies on the
production ofnewsprint and explosives. Most ofthis capital went to a
single firm: the Compañía Industrial Manufacturera (cIMsA). But even
these insider loans constituted a small part ofthe total capital ofthose
Davis, “Capital Imrnobilities,” p. 96; and Sylla, American Capital Market, pp. 12, 14,
26, 52, 209.
14 Tmporary National Economic Committee, Investigation ofConcentration, p. 255; and
Kenned, Profits and Losses, chaps. 2 and 10.
For a discussion ofthe role played by retained earnings in the finance ofthe U.S. textile
industry, seo McGouldrick, The New England Textile Manufacture.
12
16 By 1910 the United States had sorne 25 000 commercial banks alone. This does not
include the thousands oftrust companies, savings banks, and savings and loan associations.
17 Marichal, “El nacimiento,” p. 251; Sánchez Martínez, “El sistema monetario,” pp. 60,
76-77; Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment, p. 65.
18 Sánchez Martínez, “El sistema monetario,” pp. 81-82; and Marichal, “El nacimiento,”
p. 258.
19 Cárdenas and Manns, “Inflación y estabilización.”
13
I1.LLIÁ..Stephen Haber Financial Market Regulation
manufacturing firms. An analysis ofthe balance sheets ofthree ofthe
country’s largest cotton textile producers during the period from 1907
to 1913 indicates debt—equity ratios averaging 0.20:1.00. Virtually all
of this debt was short term, most of it consisting of trade credits
provided by suppliers. 2 °
Equity financing through the creation of a publicly-held, joint
stock companywas also unknown in the Mexican textile industry until
the late 1880s. Even after the first industrial companies appeared
on the Mexico City Stock Exchange, however, the use ofthe exchange
to raise equity capital remained limited. By 1908 only 14 industrials
were traded on the exchange: no new firmsjoined their ranks until the
late 1930s. Ofthose industrial companies only four were cotton manu
facturers. Thus, ofMexico’s 100 cotton textile firms in 1912 (controlling
148 milis), only 4% represented publiciytradedjoint stockcompanies. 21
These four firms, however, took a disproportionate share oftotal capital
invested in the industry, accounting for 27% of ah active spindles.
The reason that capital markets were so late in developing in
Mexico and then grew in such a limited way was iargely owing to four
factors. The first was the fact that through much of the nineteenth
century the Mexican government did not repay its debts to its bond
holders. This delayed the widespreadholding ofpaper securities by the
public, and hence, the development ofsecurities markets. Simply put,
the Mexican public learned precisely the opposite lesson that U.S.
government bondholders did: a piece of paper was not as secure an
investment in Mexico as a house, farm, or bag ofcoins. 22
The second factor was the politicized nature ofdefending property
rights and enforcing contracts. Personal ties to members ofthe govern
ment were essential for entrepreneurs to obtain the rights to official
monopolies, trade protection, government subsidies, or favorablejudi
cial rulings. Indeed, it was almost impossible to do business without
resortingto poiiticalmachinations. 23 Thus, onlywell-establishedfinan-
20 Sánchez Martínez, “El sistema monetario”; Haber, Industiy and Underdevelopment,
pp. 65-67.
21 The activity ofthe Mexico City StockExchangewas followed by Mexico’s major financial
weeklies: La Semana Mercantil, 1894-1914; El Economista Mexicano, 1896-1914; Boletín Finan
ciero y Minero, 1916-1938. The behavior of the shares of these firms is analyzed in Haber,
Industry and Underdevelopment, chap. 7. The total number of firmsis from textile manuscript
censuses in Archivo General de la Nación, Ramo de Trabajo, caja 5, legajo 4 (also see caja 31,
legajo 2.
2 Marichal, “Obstacles.”
23 Coatsworth, “Obstacles,” p. 98. For a discussion of the politicized nature of the legal
system see Walker, Business, Kinship, chaps. 1, 4-5, 7-8.
ciers with clear ties to the Díaz regime appear to have been successful
in floating equity issuesThe inclusion ofimportant political actors on
the boards ofthe majorjoint stock industrial companies (including the
brother ofthe treasury secretary, the minister ofwar, the president of
congress, the undersecretary of the treasury, and even the son of the
president) suggests the importance of those ties to the investment
community. Further cementing (and demonstrating) those ties was the
fact that many ofMexico’s most successfui financial capitalists not only
served on various government commissions and represented the gov
ernment in international financial markets, but also organized raihies
for Porfirio Díaz’s (aiways successful) election campaigns. 24
The third factor impeding the growth of capital markets was the
bose enforcement offinancial reportingrequirements. In fact, publicly
traded manufacturing companies often failed to pubhish balance sheets
in public documents (such as theDiario Oficial or the financial press) in
many years, even though the law required them to do so. The result
was that individuals tended to invest only in those enterprises control
led by important financial capitahists. In this sense, Mexico’s major
financiers piayed the same role as individuais like J.P. Morgan in
the financing of U.S. heavy industry. Their presence on the boards of
companies signaled the investment communitythat a particularenter
prise was a safe bet. 25 Two characteristics of theMexico City Stock
Exchange are particularly striking in this regard. First, almost ah of
the publicly traded industrials had well known, pohiticaily well con
nected financial capitalists hike Antonio Basagoiti, Hugo Scherer, or
León Signoret as directors. Second, there was very little entry and exit
in the stock exchange. It was not the case that smail firms tried to float
issues and failed, or that smaii firms succeeded in selhing equity and
thenwent out ofbusiness. Rather, the pattern was for a few large firms
tobe capitahizedthrough the sale ofequity. These firms then dominated
their respective product lines well into the 1920s and 19308.26
The fourth factor slowing the devebopment ofimpersonal sources
offinance was Mexico’s regulatory environment. Throughout the early
24 For a discussion of the activities of these entrepreneurs see Haber, Indust,y and
Underdevelopment, chaps. 5, 6.
25 On the U.S. case see Davis, “Capital Immobilities”; De Long, “Did J.P. Morgan’s Men
Add Value?”
26 Examples can be found in the steel, beer, soap, dynamite, cigarette, wool textile, and
paper industries, in addition to cotton textiles. See Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment,
chaps. 4, 5.
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and mid-nineteenth century, the lack ofmodern commercial and incor
poration laws retarded the development of banks and joint stock
companies. No body of mortgage credit laws was written until 1884,
and it was not until 1889 that a general incorporation law was estab
lished. Thus, formost ofthe centuryitwas extremely difficult to enforce
loan contracts and establishjoint stock companies.
Even when those laws were in place, however, new restrictive
banking regulations prevented the widespread development of credit
institutions. The Mexican government favored the nation’s largest
bank, the Banco Nacional de México, with ah kinds of special rights
and privileges. These included reserve requirements that were half
that demanded of other banks, the sole right to serve as the govern
ment’s intermediary in all its financial transactions, a monopoly for its
notes for the payment of taxes or other fees to the government, an
exemption from taxes, and the sole right to establish branch banks. At
the same time that the government created this privileged, semiofficial
institution, it erected significant barriers to entry for competingbanks,
including extremely high minimum capital requirements (originally
500 000 pesos, later raised to 1 000 000), high reserve requirements
(banks were required to hold one-third the value oftheir bank notes in
metallic currency in their vults and an additional third in the trea
sury), a prohibition on creating new banks without the authorization
of the secretary of the treasury and the Congress, a prohibition on
foreign branch banks from issuing bank notes, a 5% tax on the issue
ofbank notes, and the restriction ofbank notes to the region in which
the bank operated. 27 Making the situation even more problematic was
the revision of these banking laws every few years. The result was a
legal environment that was not only restrictive but arbitrary as well.
The motivation behind these restrictive banking policies was
essentially twofold. First, the Mexican government was more con-
cerned about establishing a secure, stable source of finance for itself
than it was in creating large numbers ofinstitutions designed to funnel
credit to manufacturers. Second, the group offinanciers that controlled
the Banco Nacional de México also happened to belong to the inner
27 When the first minimum was established in 1897, it was equal to $233 973 U.S. The
increase in 1908 brought the minimum capital requirement up to $497 265, roughly five times
the minimum for nationally chartered banks in the United States. For a discussion of these
various privileges and barriers to entry, as well as changes in banking Iaws, see Sánchez
Martínez, ‘El sistema,” pp. 43, 61-62, 67; Ludlow, “La construcción,” pp. 334-336; Bátiz V.,
“Trayectoria de la banca,” pp. 286, 287, 293.
dique ofthe Díaz regime and had usedtheirpolitical influence to obtain
a special concession thatrestricted market entry.
The tight regulation ofbanking had two important ramifications.
The first was that the number of banks and the extent of their
operations remained srnahl: industrial companies could not therefore
generally rely on them as a source offinance. The second was that the
credit market could not serve as a source offinance for speculation on
the Stock Exchange as it had in the United States (and as it would in
Brazil). This served to further impede the growth of the Mexico City
Stock Exchange.
One might think that foreign capital would have made up for the
lack of a well developed Mexican capital market. After ah, foreign
investors were pumpingbillions ofdohlars into Mexican oil wells, mines,
railroads, utilities, and export agriculture. There was in fact sorne
foreign portfolio investment in Mexico’s cotton textile industry, but the
phenomenon was not widespread. In any event, to the extent that
foreigners invested in the textile industry they invested in the large,
well established firms that already had privileged access to the Mexico
City Stock Exchange, thereby reinforcing the problem of differential
access to capital. The reason for this lack of foreign investrnent in
textiles was that manufacturing enterprises sold their output domes
tically, and thus earned their incomes in Mexican silver pesos. Silver,
unfortunatehy, lost 50% ofits value against gold during the period 1890
to 1902, meaning that the rate of return in foreign, gold-backed cur
rency, was halved once an investor converted his Mexican dividend
payments back into sterling, dollars, or francs. In fact, the one foreign
company that speciahized in Mexican manufacturing investrnents, the
Société Financiére pour l’industrie au Mexique fared very poorly for
precisely this reason. Its franc-denominated rates ofreturn were em
barrassingly low, and its annuah reports read like an apologia to its
shareholders for the depreciation ofthe Mexican peso. 28 It was largely
for this reason that foreign investors tended to focus on enterprises in
which incorne was earned in foreign, gold-backed currencies, hike oil
extraction, mining, and export agriculture, or where the Mexican
government offered sizable subsidies, like railroading.
In short, throughout its first 100 years of existence, the Mexican
28 The annual reports ofthe Société Financiére pour l’industrie au Mexique can be found
in La Semana Mercantil, 8 Aug. 1903; El Economista Mexicano, 11 Oct. 1902,6 JuIy 1904,4 Aug.
1904, 21 Oct. 1905, 18 Aug. 1906.
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cotton textile industry had to rely on informal networks for its finan
cing. When institutional innovations in the capital market created new
opportunities for flrms to obtain impersonal sources offinance, only a
small group ofentrepreneurs was able to benefit.
Until the last decade of the nineteenth century, Brazilian textile
entrepreneurs faced a capital market similar to their Mexican counter
parts. Beginning in the 1890s, however, Brazil’s capital markets,
prompted bygovernmentregulatory reforms, underwent a long process
of expansion and maturation. The result was that impersonal
sources of finance became widely available to Brazilian textile manu
facturers.
Throughout most ofthe nineteenth century, institutions designed
to mobilize impersonal sources ofcapital were largely absent in Brazil.
An organized stock exchange had functioned in Rio de Janeiro since
early in the century, but it was seldom used to finance industrial
companies. During the period from 1850 to 1885 only one manufactur
ing company was usted on the exchange, and its shares traded hands
in only 3 of those 36 years. Neither could Brazil’s mili owners appeal
to the banking system to provide them with capital. In fact, formal
banks were so scarce as to be virtually nonexistent. As late as 1888
Brazil had but 26 banks, whose combined capital totaled only 145 000
contos — roughly $48 million U.S. Only 7 ofthe country’s 20 states had
any banks at ah, and haif of ah deposits were heid by a few banks in
Rio de Janeiro.
The slow development ofthese institutions can be traced in large
part to public policies designed to restrict entry into banking. The
imperial government, which held the right to charter banks, was
primarily concernedwith creating a small number oflarge super-banks
that could serve as a source of government finance and that would
prevent financial panics. The absence ofbanks not only restricted the
amount of credit available to textile entrepreneurs, but it also meant
that banks could not underwrite securities tradingor finance securities
speculation, the way they did in the United States and Western
Europe. 3 ° Finally, restrictive policies discouraged the spread of the
corporate form ofownership: Founding ajoint stock company required
special government permission; shareholder liability was not limited;
investors were not allowed to purchase stocks on margin; and banks
were restricted from investing in corporate securities. 3 ’
The last decade of the nineteenth century, however, witnessed a
dramatie and sustained transformation ofBrazil’s capital markets. In
the wake of the Revolution of 1889 that deposed the rnonarchy and
established Brazil’s First Republic carne public policies that deregu
lated the banking industry and securities markets. These policies had
two goals: appease Brazil’s siave owning classes for the loss of their
siaves in 1888 by increasing the supply ofcredit; speed Brazil’s transi
tion from an agrarian economy run with siave labor to a modern
industrial and comrnercial econorny. As of 1889, legal barriers to entry
into banking were removed and banks could engage in whatever kind
offinancial transactions they wished. Other reforms eased the forma
tion oflimited-liabilityjoint stockcompanies and encouraged securities
trading by permitting purchases on margin. Finally, new industrial
ventures were exernpted from taxes and customs duties.
Also of importance were mandatory disclosure laws that made
managers more accountabie to stockhoiders. Brazil’s publicly traded
corporationswere requiredtoproducefinancialstaternents twice ayear
and reprint them in public documents (such as theDiario Oficial or the
Jornal do Commercio). In addition, their biannual reports had to list
the names of ah stockholders and the numbers ofshares they control
led. Investors could thus obtain reasonably good information on the
health offirrns and the identities oftheir major shareholders. 3 2
Fortextile industrialiststhese reforms produced dramaticresu1ts.
Over the short terrn, the Encilharnento, as the investrnent boom carne to
be called, created large nurnbers ofbanks, which both directly lent funds
to manufacturers as well as financed stock market specu1ation.’ The
second and more important effect of the Encilhamento was that it
29 Topik, Folitical Economy, p. 28; Peláez and Suzigan, História monetária, chaps. 2-5;
Saes, Crédito e bancos, p. 73; Levy, História da bolsa, pp. 109-112; Stein, The Brazilian Cotton
Textile Manufacture, pp. 25-27.
° Sylla, American Capital Market, pp. 52, 209.
‘ Levy, História da bolsa, p. 117; Peláez and Suzigan, História monetária, pp. 78-83,
96-97; Saes, Crédito e bancos, pp. 22, 86.
32 Shareholder lists were not pubhshed in the abbreviated reports reprinted in the Jornal
do Commercio or the Diario Ofuial, but they were published in the original armual reports.
Topik, Folitical Economy, pp. 28-31; Peláez and Suzigan, História monetária, p. 143;
Stein, The Brazilian Cotton Textile Manufacture, p. 86; Crédito e bancos.
34 Levy, História da bolsa, pp. 117, 245.
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financed the creation of large numbers of joint stock manufacturing
companies. In 1881 there were only two joint publically owned cotton
textile enterprises; by 1898 there were 14, which grew to 25 in 1905, to
66 in 1914, and to 94 by 1927. Thus, as early as 1914, 66 ofBrazil’s 205
cotton textile companies (32%)werepubliclytraded, limitedliabilityjoint
stock corporations. 35 These firms with access to the equities markets
accounted for 60% of ah invested capital in the mdustry. Recali that at
a similar date in Mexico only 4% of cotton textile flrms were publicly
traded, and that these firms took up 27% ofinvested capital.
The Encilhamento also created a market for publicly traded cor
porate debt. This bond market, hike the market for stocks, was located
in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo and primarily served firms in those
states. 36 As early as 1905, 31 of Brazil’s 98 textile firms were raising
capital through the sale ofdebt. By 1915, 50 ofthe country’s 174 firms
reported bond debt in their census returns. In fact, a comparison ofthe
1905 and 1915 censuses indicates that new debt issues accounted for
29% ofall new investment duringthat tenyear period (see table 1). For
the large-scale, Rio de Janeiro and Distrito Federal firrns, which were
able to easily tap into the bond markets, new debt issues accounted for
69% of ah new investment from 1905 to 1915. Thus, from 1905 to 1915,
the average debt-equity ratio grew from 0.16:1.00 to 0.27:1.00 for
Braziljan cotton textile firms as a whole and from 0.14:1.00 to 0.43:1.00
for firms in the Federal District and Rio de Janeiro. 37 Recali that
Mexico’s large, publicly traded, vertically integrated firms had debt
equity ratio’s roughly half that of their Rio and Distrito Federal
counterparts, almost none ofwhich was long term bond debt. In fact,
ifwe were to include the types oftrade credits from suppliers and other
short term loans that made up the liabilities of Mexican firms (these
are not enumerated in the Brazilian censuses), the differences between
Brazil and Mexico would be even larger.
The development ofthe bond market appears to have been slowed
by the First World War.Between 1915 and 1925, new long term bond
issues accounted for only 4% of net new additions to invested capital.
Thus, by 1925 debt-equity ratios feil to 0.13:1, less than halftheir 1915
levels (see tables 1 and 2). The most important source of new invest
ment capital was retained earnings, which accounted for 58% of new
additions to capital. The remainder ofnew capital spending was made
up of new equity issues by already established companies and the
founding of new firms, particularly in the state of Sao Paulo. 38 In
the latter part of the 1920s the debt market began to recover, though
it appears that much of the debt issued was used to fund operating
losses during the Great Depression. As table 2 indicates, the increase
in debt almost exactly matches the contraction of retained earnings
during the period 1927 to 1934.
These patterns are mirrored by a micro-level analysis of 15 Rio de
Janeiro and Distrito Federal firms that 1 have traced across the 1905,
1915, 1925, and 1934 censuses (table 3). This study of same-firm
financing controls for the possible effects ofthe entry and exit offirms
in the aggregate analysis. In these 15 large scale, publicly traded
firms, new long term debt issues accounted for 29% ofnet new invest
ment between 1905 and 1910, and 45% between 1910 and 1915. By
1915, 11 of the 15 firms had gone to the bond market, producing an
average debt-equity ratio of 0.57:1.00, up from 0.26:1.00 in 1905.
Between 1915 and 1920, however, only 15% of these firms’ new addi
tions to capital were financed by new bond debt. From 1920 to 1925,
new debt issues accounted for none ofthe growth ofthese firms. Most
of their expansion was financed out of retained earnings. Thus, their
average debt-equity ratio feil to 0.35:1.00 in 1925, roughly 60% of its
1915 level. 3
Calculated from: Centro Industrial do Brasil, O Centro Industrial; Levy, História da
bolsa, pp. 245, 385. The peak number ofpublicly traded textile firms was reached in 1922, when
64 textile issues traded on the Rio exchange. By 1927 this had fallen to 52 firms, as the slow
growth ofthe Brazilian economy in the early 1920s forced out weak firms.
36 Duringthe penod under study, Rio de Janeiro was Brazil’s capital. The Distrito Federal
comprisedthe area immediately around the city ofRio de Janeiro, much the waythat the Distrito
Federal endoses the city of México. Surrounding the Distrito Federal was the state of Rio de
Janeiro.
The averages reported are weighted by the size of each firm’s total capital investment.
These debt-equity ratios do not include short term bank debt or accounts payable, which would
have raised the ratios even higher. The censuses did not report these other sources of debt.
Estimates of new investment and its sources computed from Vasco, A indu.stria; Centro
Industrial, O centro industrial.
38 Calculated from Vasco, A industria; Centro Industrial, O centro industrial; Centro
Industrial de Fiaçao e Tecelagem, Relatorio, 1924. All averages are weighted by the value of
capital.
Calculated from Vasco, A industria; Centro Industrial, O centro industrial; Centro
Industrial de Fiaçéo e Tecelagem, Relatorio 1924; Centro Industrial de Fiaço e Tecelagem,
Fiaçéo e Tecelagem. Ml averages are weighted by the value ofcapital. Rio de Janeiro and Distrito
Federal firms were chosen for study because the county’s stock and bond markets were located
there. The firms are the Companhia Petropolitana, Companhia Magéense, Companhia Manu
factora Fluminense, Companhia Corcovado, Companhia Brasil Industrial, Companhia Confian
ça Industrial, Companhia Corneta, Companhia Sao Pedro de Alcantara, Companhia Dona Izabel,
Companhia Alliança, Companhia Progreso Industrial do Brasil, Companhia Industrial Campis




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In short, Brazilian textile industrialists were limited in their
sources of finance throughout most of the nineteenth century. Begin
ning in the late 1880s, however, regulatory reforms brought about
important innovations in financial intermediation that made access to
institutional sources offinance relatively easy for many entrepreneurs.
Even though the development of these new sources of finance was
slowed bythe First WorldWar, it still produced an extraordinar’ilylarge
and well integrated capital market by the standards of developing







II. Finance and the Structure and Growth
ofthe Textile Industry
What effects did these differences in the development of capital have
onthe development ofthe textile industryin the countriesunder study?
One would expect at Ieast three. First, Mexico’s textile industry should
have grown much more slowly than that of Brazil. Second, privileged
access to capital should have served as a barrier to entry: capital
immobilities should have resulted in high levels of industrial concen
tration. Industry should have been most concentrated in Mexico and
least concentrated in the United States, with Brazilfallingbetweenthe
two. Third, we would expect different trajectories of concentration.
Concentration shouldhave fallenthe fastestinBrazil, afterthe opening
ofits capital markets in the 1890s, and most slowly in Mexico.
An examination of the data on the development of the textile
industry in the three countries bears out these hypotheses. In regard to
the rate ofgrowth ofthe textile industry, the Brazilian textile industry,
which had been virtually nonexistent in the first half of nineteenth
century, quickly outgrew Mexico’s after its capital markets opened up.
As late as 1883, the entire modern sector ofthe Brazilian cotton goods
industry numbered only 44 firms runningjust under 80 000 spindles,
less than one-third the size of Mexico’s cotton goods industry (see
table 4). This relative size relationship continued into the mid-1890s,
but overthe followingtenyears widespread access to impersonal sources
of capital in Brazil meant that its cotton textile industry was able to
outgrow Mexico’s by a factor of five, producing for the first time an
absolute size difference in favor ofBrazil. By the outbreak of First World
War, Brazil’s industrywas roughlytwicethe size ofMexico’s, a gapwhich
grew to three to one by the onset ofthe Great Depression.
Table 4. Size estimates ofthe cotton textile industries of Brazil,
Mexico, India, and the [Ínited States (in spindles), 1843-1934
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Table 4 (continue)
Year Mexico Brazil India USA
1918 689 173
1919 735308
1920 753837 6763036 34603471
1921 770945 1621 300a
1922 803 230
1923 802363 1700 000a
1924 812165 2200612
1925 840 890 2 397 380








1934 2 507 126
Sources:
Mexico: Razo and Haber, “The Rate of Growth ofProductivity in Mexico.”
India: Reports ofthe Bombay Millowner’s Association, 1900, 1911, 1920, 1930.
USA: Haber, “Industrial Concentration and the Capital Markets.”
Brazil: Boija Castro, “Relatorio,” pp. 3-73.
Commissáo (para) Exposiçáo Universal (em) Philadelphia, The Empire of Brazil,
pp. 285-287 and statistical tables.
Commisso de Inquerito Nacional, Relatorio, p. 15.
Branner, Cotton in the Empire ofBrazil.
Consul Ricketts, Report, C4657, lxv(1886), pp. 187-188, as cited by Stein, The Brazilian
Cotton, Appendix 1.
Dos Santos Pires, Relato,-io, pp. 24-25.
De Carvalho, “0 Cafe.” Also, De Carvalho, “O AlgodAo.”
Cunha Vasco, “Industria do algodAo.”
Censo Industrial do Brasil, “Industria de Transportes.”
Graham Clark, “Cotton Goods;” Cunha Vasco, “Fabrica de FiacAo;” Bandeira Junior,
“Industria no Estado de SAo Paulo.»
Centro Industrial do Brasil, Relatorio, 1915.
Centro Industrial do Brasil, Centro na Conferencia Algodeira.
Centro Industrial de FiaçAo e Tecelagem de Algodáo, Relatorio, 1921-1922, 1923, 1924,
1925, 1927.
CIFrA, Fabricas Filiadas.
CIFrA, FiaçAo e Tecelagem.
a Estimate based on particial census information.
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This is not to argue that access to capital was the only factor
influencing the rate of growth of the textile industry. There were
numerous other constraints to the development ofindustry.° The data
suggest, however, that problems of capital mobilization played an
important role in the slow development of industry in both countries
during the nineteenth century. First, the fact that the textile indus
tries in both Mexico and Brazil underwent a spurt of growth after
impersonal sources of finance became available indicates that their
lack was a constraint prior to that. Second, the fact that Brazil’s textile
industry rapidly outgrew Mexican industry after its capital markets
opened up suggests an important role for impersonal sources offinance
in a country’s rate ofindustrial growth.
One might argue that capital immobilities had little to dowith the
rate of growth of the textile industry: Demand factors were far more
important in influencing industry growth. Mexico’s industry was
smaller and grew less quickly than that of Brazil because it had
a smaller, poorer population. A comparison ofBrazil and Mexico mdi
cates, however, that demand factors cannot explain differences in
observed industry size. True, Brazil’s population, which was roughly
equal to that ofMexico in the early 1870s (9.9 million and 9.1 million,
respectively) grew at almost twice Mexico’s rate up to 1910 because of
Brazil’s policy ofsubsidizing European immigration. Mexican national
income, however, outgrew Brazilian national income at a similar rate
duringthis same period. Circa 1877, Mexicannational income was only
55% that of Brazil. By 1910 it was within 6% of Brazil’s. More impor
tantly, Mexican income per capita outgrew that ofBrazil by a factor of
10. In 1877, Mexican per capita income was 75% that ofBrazil. By 1910
Mexican per capita income was 40% higher than Brazil’s. 4 ’ Given that
the income elasticity ofdemand fortextiles was veryhigh, Mexico likely
had a much higher per capita demand for textile products than the
differences in per capita income would indicate.42 In short, it is hard to
reconcile a demand side story with Brazil’s lower absolute levels ofper
40 For a discussion ofthese constraints in Mexico see Haber, Industry and Underdevelop
ment, chaps. 3-5; for a discussion of the Brazilian case see: Stein, Brazilian Cotton Textile
Manufacture; Suzigan, Industria Brasileira.
41 National income data from Coatsworth, “Obstacles,” p. 82. Population data from
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática, Estadísticas, p. 9; Instituto Brasi
leiro de Geografia e Estatística, Estatísticas, p. 33.
42 Contemporary observers noted this high income elasticity of demand for textile
products. Their observations can be found in Haber, Industry and Underdeuelopment, pp. 28-29.
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capita income and lower rates ofgrowth ofboth per capita and national
income. 43
As for the effects of capital immobilities on industrial concentra
tion, the data are unequivocal: access to capital had a significant effect
on the level of concentration. Table 5 presents estimates of four-firm
concentration ratios (the percent of the market controlled by the four
largest firms) and Herfindahi indices (the sum of the squares of the
market shares of ah firms in an industry) for Mexico, Brazil, India, and
the United States. 44 There are a number ofstrikingfeatures ofthe data.
The first is the low, and continually declining, level ofconcentra
tion in the United States. The average four-firm ratio duringthe period
1850-1930 was 0.089. The trend over time was for concentration to
decline at 0.5% peryear. From 1860 to 1920, the four-firm ratio dropped
from 0.126 to 0.066. The Great Depression temporarily reversed the
trend, the result of several merger attempts designed to bring the in
dustry’s excess capacity under control and end a period of cutthroat
competition. Within a few years, however, most ofthose mergers had
failed. Post-1930 evidence indicates that concentration had returned to
its 1920 level by 1937. This is precisely the kind ofpattern that would
be expected in a rapidly growing industry characterized by constant
returns to scale technology and insignificant barriers to entry.
The second isthatthe opening ofMexico’s capital markets actually
produced an increase in concentration. The trend in Mexico from the
1840s to the early 1880s was a gradual decrease in concentration:
exactly the trend that one would expect in an expanding industry
characterized by constant returns to scale technology. As table 6
Table 5. Indices ofconcentration in the cotton textile industries
of Brazil, Mexico, India,nd the United States, 1840-1934
Four firm ratio Herfindahi index

















































































































Accounting for imports would not overturn these results. Both countries were highiy
protectionist, with tariffs oflen equal to 300% of the value of goods abroad. Imports by 1910
therefore accounted for only 20 ofconsumption. This was almost entirely high value, fine weave
goods.
These estimates of concentration are ah calculated at the firm level. For the U.S.,
Mexican, and Brazihian data, this invoived combining the market shares of ah milis heid by a
single corporation, partnership, or sole proprietor. Market shares for Mexico and Brazil were
calculated from estimates of the actual sales or value of output of milis. Market shares for the
United States had to be estimated from information on installed spindles. Econometric work on
the United States indicates that there was a 25% difference in output per spindle between
average and best practice techniques. 1 therefore assumed that the iargest firms in the United
States were 25% more productive than the average, and adjusted their market shares upwards
accordingly. Qn average and best practice techniques see Davis and Stettler, “The New England
Textile Industry,” p. 231.
Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation ofConcentration, pp. 253-254;
Reynolds, “Cut Throat Competition,” pp. 740-742; Kennedy, Profits and Losses, chaps. 2-6;
Wright, “Cheap Labor,” p. 106.
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Table 5 (continue)
Fourfirm ratio Herfindahi index





1920 0.286 0.206 0.066 0.036
1924 0.233 0.331 0.028 0.043









Mexico: sncp, Estudio de la industrialización.
Barau Martínez, «Estadísticas económicas,” table 13; SHCP, Estudio de la industriali
zación.
SHCP, Estudio de la industrialización.
Barjau Martínez, “Estadísticas económicas,” tables 17-21.
Secretaría de Fomento, Colonización e Industria, Memoria 1852.
Gobierno del Estado de México, Departamento de México.
Secretaría del Estado, Memoria de la Secretaría del Estado.
Pérez Hernández, Estadística de la República Mexicana.
Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria 1865.
García Cubas, Cuadro geográfico.
Secretaría de Fomento, Boletín semestral.
García Cubas, Mexico Trade.
Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario estadístico, 1893-1894.
Secretaría de Hacienda, Memoria.
Estadística de la república mexicana.
Semana mercantil.
Archivo General de la Nación, “Extracto de hilados y tejidos, 1912.”
“Extracto de hilados y tejidos, 1913.”
El Economista Mexicano.
SHCP, Boletín.
India: See table 4.
USA: See table 4.
a Concentration by estimated capacity, measured at the firm level. A detailed discussion
ofthe estimation procedures is available from the author.
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indicates, Mexico’s four-firm ratio feli from a high of0.579 in 1840 to a
low of0.158 in 1883, whi1 the Herfindahi dropped from a 0.114 to 0.019
over the same period. Beginning in the 1880s, the trend reversed, even
though the industry was witnessing rapid growth. By 1902, both the
four-firm ratio and the Herfindahi had surpassed their 1843 leveis,
standing at 0.381 and 0.063, respectively. Concentration then began to
decrease again to 1912, when the Revolution interceded and again
reversed the trend.
The final striking feature of the data is that it indicates that the
more profound opening of Brazil’s capital markets produced exactly
the opposite resultthanthat obtained in Mexico. 46 Compared to Mexico,
Brazil’s textile industry was surprisingly unconcentrated, and became
increasingly less so over time. Prior to the 1890s, Brazil’s relatively
small textile industry displayed higher levels of concentration, as
measured by the four-firm ratio, than Mexico’s. By 1905, however,
relatively widespread access to institutional sources of capital drove
Brazil’s four-firm ratio down to two-thirds ofMexico’s, a ratio that was
then maintained through the 1930s. The drop in the Herfindahi Index
was even more pronounced. During the period 1875-1878, the Herfin
dahi Index for Brazil was more than ten times that of Mexico. By
1905-1906, Brazil’s Herfindahl was 34% lower than Mexico’s, and by
1912-1914 it was 69% lower.
One might argue that Mexico’s higher concentration ratios had
little to do with capital immobilities: High leveis ofconcentration were
produced by demand, not supply factors. Mexico had higher levels of
concentration and a different trajectory ofconcentration because it had
a smaller textile industry than Brazil or the United States. There are
four problems with this une ofargument.
The first is that this argument assumes that there is a direct link
between industry size and industry structure: The larger a country’s
industry, the less concentrated it should be. In order to test this notion,
1 estimated four firm concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices for
the Indian cotton textile industry. Since India’s industry was roughly
three times the size of Brazil’s we should observe a lower level of
concentration there. In fact, India’s average level of concentration
46 One might argue that these differences in concentration would disappear ifimporta of
foreign textiles were accounted for, butthat argument does not stand up to the empirical evidence
on textile imports. Indeed, both Brazil and Mexico followed highly protectionist policies after
1890, virtually eliminating imported cloth except for fine weave, high value goods.
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during the first three decades ofthe twentieth century was very close
to that of Brazil, and during the 1920s exceeded Brazilian concentra
tion (see table 5).
The second is that Mexico’s industry leaders were tremendous
operations in an absolute sense. Mexico’s leadingfirms were not simply
large relative to the small Mexican market, they were enormous
operations, even by U.S. and Indian standards. Mexico’s largest firm
in 1912, for example, the Compañía Industrial de Orizaba (cruosA), was
a four-mill operation employing 4284 workers running 92 708 spindles
and 3 899 looms. Had it been located in the United States, it would
have ranked among the 25 largest cotton textile enterprises. Had it
been located in India it would have been among the top 12 textile
enterprises. Significantly, in the country with the market size closest
to that of Mexico, Brazil, the largest firm was actually smaller than
CIDOSA. Brazil’s largest producer, the Companhia Arnerica Fabril, con
trolled 6 mills in 1915, employing 3 100 workers running 85 286
spindles and 2 170 looms.
The third problem with this argument is that it does not stand up
to empirical evidence on the relationship between total factor produc
tivity (‘ri’p) and firm size. 1 have estimated Cobb Douglas Production
Functions for both the Mexican and Brazilian cotton industries, and
these do not reveal positive scale economies. In fact, in the Mexican case,
for the census years 1895, 1896, 1912, and 1913 the scale coefficient is
negative, indicating that firms were suboptimallylarge. 47 These produc
tion functionresults are buttressed by survivor analysis, whichindicates
that in both Brazil and Mexico the minimum efficient scale ofproduction
was a firrn size that corresponded to less than a 1% market share.
The fourth problem with this hypothesis is that it cannot explain
why Mexican concentration increased during a period when the indus
trywas experiencing rapid growth, the years 1878-1902. Without sorne
supply factor intervening during this period, Mexican concentra
tion should have continued to decline, instead ofjumping back up to its
1843 level.
In order to test this hypothesis in a formal manner, 1 estimated
an OLS regression that measures the elasticity of concentration with
respect to industry size. The logic behind the estimation is the follow
ing: In an industry characterized by modest returns to scale, with no
‘ Armando Razo and Stephen Haber, “The Rate of Growth of Productivity in Mexico:
Evidence from the Cotton Textile Industry,”Journal ofLatin American Studies (forthcoming).
significant technological changes that would raise the minirnum effi
cient scale of productionin a discontinuous way, we should be able to
predict the level of concentration simply by knowing the size of the
industry. Similar regression results for Brazil and Mexico would mdi-
cate that concentration was simply a function of industry size. If,
however, similar specifications ofthe regression for each country yield
different results, then sorne intervening variable (like an imperfection
in a factor market) must have been at work. 8
Table 6 presents various regression specifications. All values are
converted to natural logs in order to capture how changes in the size of
the industry affect the change in concentration. Industry size is mea
sured by the number ofspindles.
The first panel of table 6 measures concentration by the Herfin
dahi Index. For Brazil we obtain unambiguous results: The parameter
estimate for (ln)spindles is — 0.447 with an R 2 of 0.89. The estimate is
statistically significant at the 1% level ofconfidence. In short, in Brazil,
the elasticity of concentration with respect to size was 44.7% (as
industry size doubles concentration decreased by 44.7%). For Mexico,
however, the results are much less robust: the parameter estimate for
(ln)firms is significantly lower (0.046), has the wrong sign (as industry
size doubles, concentration increases by 4.6%), and is not statisti
cally significant. Moreover, the R 2 is only 0.04, indicating that there is
no correlation between industry structure and industry size.
Perhaps it is the case that these results are driven by differences
in the distribution of observations over time. One rnight argue, for
example, that technological change might have had an effect Qn the
relationshipbetween industrysize and industrystructure, and thefirst
specification does not account for these changes because ofdifferences
in the frequency ofthe observations. 1 therefore added atime durnmy to
the regression in specification 2. The addition ofthis dummy, however,
strengthens the qualitative results. As specification 2 ofpanel 1 mdi-
48 The model makes the reasonable assumption that there were no discontinuous jumps
in minimum efficient scales in either country, though it does allow for a gradual increase in
minimum efficient scales. For this reason, it is unlikely that the elasticities ofthe size variables
will sum to unity. Observations by contemporaries indicate that there were no discontinuous
jumps in textile manufacturing technology during the period that affected the Brazilian oc
Mexican industries. The only major innovation was the Northrup automatic loom, which was
developed in the l890s. But the Northrup loom was not widely adopted in either country (there
were only 25 ofthem in service in Mexico as late as 1910). Moreover, to the extentthatthere were
technologicaljumps, these would be more pronounced in the Brazilian regressions than in those
for Mexico, because ofBrazil’s fasterpurchase ofnew capacity. This wouid tend to bias the results
against the hypothesis advanced here.
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Dependent variable: ln(Herfindahl Index)
t statistics in parentheses
Mexico Brazil
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 1 Spec. 2
Intercept —3.933 —10.667 2.623 4.887
(—3.332) (—2.477) (4.021) (2.547)
Ln(spindles) proxy 0.046 0.637 —0.447 —0.733
for industry size (.502) (1.699) (—9.288) (—3.136)
Time —0.017 0.0237
(—1.621) (1.250)
DW 0.82 1.11 0.07 0.13
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04 0.89 0.89
N 22 22 12 12
Panel II
Dependent variable: ln(four-firm ratio)
t statistics in parentheses
Mexico Brazil
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 1 Spec. 2
Intercept —1.603 —5.349 2.295 4.346
(—1.874) (—1.667) (5.318) (3.716)
Ln(spindles) proxy for 0.024 0.353 —0.272 —0.531
industry size (.365) (1.264) (—8.538) (—3.727)
Time —0.009 0.021
(—1.210) (1.858)
DW 0.85 1.03 0.06 0.14
Adjusted R2 —0.04 —0.02 0.87 0.89
N 22 22 12 12
Source: Calculated from data in tables 4 and 5.
cates, in Brazil, as industry size doubled, concentration decreased by
73%, whereas in Mexico as industry size doubled, concentration in
creased by 64%. The adjusted R 2 for Brazil is 0.89 and for Mexico 0.04,
indicating no correlation in Mexico between the two variables.
Panel II repeatsthe procedures ofpanel 1, but substitutes thefour
firm concentration ratio for the Herfindahi Index as the dependent
variable. The qualitative results are similar to those of panel 1. In
Brazil, the relationship between industry size and industry structure
is exactly what one would expect from an industry characterized by
modest returns to scale: As the industry grows, concentration de
creases. In Mexico, however, the expected relationship between indus
try size and industry structure, even accounting for technological
change over time, does not hold: As the industry grew, concentration
increased, suggesting that in Mexico an industry that was charac
terized by constant returns to scale was behaving like an industry
characterized by sizable increasing returns to scale.
What mechanisms were at work causing Mexico’s level ofindus
trial concentration to increase during a period ofrapid expansion? Why
did the trajectory ofconcentration in Mexico reverse in the 1890s, and
why did it resume its fail after 1902?
The answer to these questions basically turns on the effects ofthe
limited opening of Mexico’s capital markets. In the years after 1889
Mexico’s big, multi-plant, industry leaders (the Compañía Industrial
de Orizaba, Compañía Industrial Veracruzana, Compañía Indus
trial de Atlixco, and Compañía Industrial de San Antonio Abad) were
founded with capital provided by the Mexico City Stock Exchange.
These firms were able to purchase newer, more efficient equipment
faster than their smaller competitors who did not have recourse to the
sale ofequity. The result was increasing leveis ofconcentration.
Why then did concentration drop in the years from 1902 to 1912?
Why did the industry leaders not continue to exercise market domi
nance? The answer is that after they achieved control of the market,
Mexico’s industry leaders dramatically slowed theirrate ofnew invest
ment. A comparison ofthe 1895 and 1912 censuses indicatesthat firms
that had access to the capital market did not purchase new machinery
at afasterratethan did non-capital market firms. In fact, a comparison
offirms extant in both censuses indicates that, ifanything, firms that
did not have access to impersonal sources of capital purchased new
machinery at a faster rate than firms that had access to the capital
market. Under a set of assumptions that minimizes the replacement
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of oid equipment by new equipment (thereby biasing downward the
total addition of new machinery), the non-capital market firms pur
chased new looms at a rate roughly equal to that ofthe capital market
firms and purchased new spindles at a rate more than 50% faster.
Under a set of assumptions that maximizes the repiacement of oid
machinery by new machinery (thereby biasing upwards the total
addition of new machinery), the non-capital market firms purchased
new looms at a 13% faster rate than capital market firms and new
spindles at a 35% faster rate.
In short, the data suggest that the handful offirms that were able
to mobilize capital through institutional sources gained a one-time
advantage over their competitors. They then sat back and watched
their rents dissipate as their smaller competitors gradually closed the
size gap through the reinvestment of retained earnings. Why they
pursued this strategy is somewhat of a mystery at this point. It
may have been that their managers perceived (incorrectly) that their
ability to mobilize institutional sources ofcapital would have served as
a disincentive to new entrants. Potential new entrants would, accord
ing to this rationaie, have seen that the industry leaders could rapidly
instali excess capacity, thereby increasing production and lowering
prices below the potential entrant’s long run average cost curve. Or it
may have been that stockholders did not trust the management ofthe
enterprises or were operatingwith a short time horizon. Theytherefore
demanded that all profits be paid out as dividends. It might also have
been that the rates ofreturn available from the big, rnulti-plant mills
were disappointing to the investment community. New infusions of
equity capital may therefore have dried up after 1902. Evidence from
the Mexican financial press lends considerable support to this last
interpretation. Ofthe four firms that were able to raise capital through
the securities markets (cIDosA, CIVSA, CIASA, and San Antonio Abad),
two paid dividends on an extremely irregular basis. One ofthem, San
Antonio Abad, failed to pay anything from 1899 to 1906. When it
resumed paying in 1906 and 1907 the real value of its dividends per
share were less than 20% of the average dividend per share prior to
1899. Though the two industry leaders, CIDOSA and CIVSA paid steady
dividends, the real value of CIDOSA’S dividends feil by two-thirds after
1900 and stayed at this lower leve! for the rest ofthe decade. 49 Work in
progress hopes to shed additional light on this issue.
Haber, Industry and Underdeveloprnent, p. 115.
Whatever the source of this peculiar behavior by the industry
leaders, the lack of new’investment on their part, coupled with thé
relatively slow rate of growth of new investment implied by the need
to finance new plant and equipment purchases out ofretained earnings
by their competitors, suggests that the overail rate ofgrowth ofproduc
tivity in Mexico must have been low relative to Brazil and the United
States.
III. Conclusions
What lessons are there to be drawn from this story about government
regulation, capital market development, and the growth and structure
ofindustry?
The first is that government regulatory policies had a significant
effect on the growth of capital markets. Capital market development
in the three countries studied here was not completely endogenous to
the process of economic growth: Different histories of government
regulation in each of the cases gaye rise to very different sizes and
structures ofcapital markets.
Second, capital immobilities appear to have been in large part the
product ofthe inability ofinvestors to obtain information and monitor
managers. In Mexico, informationwas difficult to obtain. This gaye well
known financiers with established reputations privileged access to the
capital markets. This was a very different outcome than that which
obtained in Brazil, where the costs ofinformation appear to have been
much lower.
Third, differences in capital market developmenthad a significant
impact on the rate ofgrowth of industry. Mexico’s financial system, in
which a small group of entrepreneurs could get access to impersonal
sources of capital while most entrepreneurs could not, gaye rise to a
small textile industry relative to Brazil. The rapid expansion of the
Brazilian textile industry after the opening up of the capital markets
in the late 1880s underlines the important role played by access to
finance in industrial growth. In sum, lack of access to institutional
sources of capital because of poorly developed capital markets was a
non-negligible obstacle to industrial development in the nineteenth
century.
Fourth, imperfections in capital markets also had a significant
effect on the structure of industry. The much more limited opening of
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the capital markets in Mexico gaye rise to higher leveis of concentra
tionthan in Brazil and the United States. Analysis ofthe data indicates
that these differences existed independent ofindustry size.
Fifth, the data analyzed to date suggest that Mexico’s peculiarly
uncompetitive structure ofindustry may have created disincentives to
new investment by its industry leaders. In addition, the need to rely on
retained earnings to finance most new investment would suggest that
in general Mexico’s rate of growth of investment was much slower
than in countries that had more open capital markets. The result may
well have been much slower rates ofgrowth of productivity, meaning
that Mexican industry may have become increasingly less competitive
over time. Work in progress hopes to shed light on this issue.
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David Alan Aschauer*
Abstract: This paper develops and empirically implements a neoclassical
growth model in which output depends on private capital and human
capital as well as the quantity, means offinancing, and efficiency ofuse of
public capital. The empirical analysis is based on a cross section of 46
developing countries over the period from 1970 to 1990. In general, the
paper finds empirical support for the importance of each of the three
dimensions ofpublic capital —quantity, financing, and efficiency— for long
run standards of living and for transitional growth rates. The empirical
results are applied to the recent performance ofthe Mexican economy.
Resumen: En este artículo se elabora y pone en práctica empíricamente un
modelo neoclásico de desarrollo en el cual el producto depende tanto del
capital privado y del capital humano como de la cantidad, los medios de
financiamiento y la eficiencia del uso del capital público. El análisis
empírico se basa en un estudio comparativo de 46 países en desarrollo a lo
largo de un periodo que va de 1970 a 1990. En general, los resultados
empíricos del modelo apoyan la importancia que tienen para el nivel de
vida en el largo plazo y las tasas de crecimiento del periodo de transición
todas y cada una de las tres dimensiones del capital público: magnitud,
financiamiento y eficiencia. Los resultados empíricos se aplican al desem
peño reciente de la economía mexicana.
M
exico, like nearly ah countries, invests heavily in its stock ofpublic
infrastructure capital —transportation systems, water supply
and water treatment plants, electrical supply, and communications. At
a basic level, such investment is needed for a strong, flexible, and
vibrant economy. Workers need to be able to use transport to get to their
workplaces; companies need to use fresh water and dispose ofwaste as
well as to have access to electrical power and communication facilities.
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